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Abstract
With the change in donors’ priorities since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, there has been a
decline in annual aid inflows to Pacific island countries (PICs), which have been among the world’s top
recipients of aid per capita in the past. Along with fall in aid inflows, growing annual domestic budgetary
deficits in recent years have forced some PICs to finance them through borrowing. This paper seeks to
examine whether external debt contributed to economic growth in PICs by undertaking a study of six major
PICs.
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1. Introduction
Since their independence in the second half of last century, Pacific island countries (PICs)1
have been receiving substantial bilateral grant assistance each year from the two metropolitan
powers in the region, namely Australia and New Zealand and the European Union as well as
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E-mail address: Jayaraman tk@usp.ac.fj (T.K. Jayaraman).
1 There are 14 independent Pacific island countries, which constitute the official, international organization called Pacific
Islands Forum. These are Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niue,
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
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other developed countries, including the United States, Japan and European Union. Such annual
transfers, known as official development assistance (ODA) were helpful in bridging annual fiscal
deficits and resource gaps between domestic savings and investment. They also served as cushion
against pressures caused by annual current account deficits in their balance of payments and
the resultant pressures on PICs’ exchange rates.2 However, following changes in the priorities
of the donor community in the late 1980s, annual ODA inflows have declined over the period.
These developments along with growing annual domestic budgetary deficits forced some PICs to
borrow. As there were limits to domestic borrowing, some PICs in recent times began to borrow
from overseas in an increasing manner, aside from the traditional, international funding agencies.
Fiji, for example, floated in 2006 an international bond in overseas capital markets, primarily to
diversify its sources of borrowing.
This paper seeks to examine whether past external borrowing has contributed to economic
growth in PICs. Due to data constraints, our study is confined to six major PICs, including
Papua New Guinea (PNG) along with three other Melanesian countries (Fiji, Solomon Islands
and Vanuatu) and two Polynesian countries (Samoa and Tonga). These are the only PICs having
reliable national accounts data series for any meaningful analysis. However, the income data
for four PICs, namely Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu are available only from
the mid 1980s. Since PICs share many commonalities, it is considered appropriate to resort
to a panel data analysis. The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews trends
in external debt and growth; the third section outlines the modeling methodology while the
fourth section presents empirical results. The final section draws some conclusions with policy
implications.
2. Trends in external debt and growth in PICs
In the midst of substantial diversity in regard to land and other natural resources and pop-
ulation, the six PICs selected for the study share many commonalities. They relate to various
constraints to growth: dependence on a narrow range of commodities for exports; strong reliance
on tourism as major foreign exchange earner and provider of jobs; communal land tenure system,
restricting the marketability of land as an economic commodity thereby inhibiting land based
activities; isolation from major markets; proneness to natural disasters of all kinds; and exter-
nal economic shocks. While foreign aid, as a proportion of GDP in all the six PICs decreased
over a 12-year period, external debt as a proportion of GDP registered substantial increases
in all PICs over the corresponding period, with the exception of Fiji (Table 1). The decline
in Fiji’s external debt, in particular, beginning from the late 1980s is attributed to a deliber-
ate decision by the interim government after two military coups in 1987, as a reaction to the
forced isolation of the country by the international community. The elected governments in the
1990s continued the policy of reducing external debt level by prematurely retiring its outstanding
debt.
Table 2 provides details of external debt incurred by the selected PICs. As of 2004, the latest year
for which data are available (World Bank, 2006a), total external debt stock reflecting outstanding
loans against the country, referred to as EDT and expressed as the percentage of country’s GDP
stands highest (150%) in Samoa. The next in order are Solomon Islands (69%), Papua New Guinea
2 Six of the 14 PICs, namely Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu have their own
national currencies, while the remaining eight have been using currencies of their former rulers as legal tender.
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Table 1






















Fiji 840 2195 90 9 61 3.9 1.8
PNG 5600 714 139 31 40 12.8 7.2
Samoa 181 1672 75 20 186 42.6 14.5
Solomon
Island
471 550 129 11 132 21.7 11
Tonga 101 1629 55 3 270 26.3 16.4
Vanuatu 215 1493 119 1 154 33 11.7
Source: ADB (2006), World Bank (2006a).
(61%), Tonga and Vanuatu (38%) and Fiji (8%). Among the six PICs, Fiji having been recently
designated as a low middle-income country, is the only country, which is not presently eligible for
borrowing on concessional terms3 from international agencies. As a consequence, concessional
loans dominate EDT in all the other five PICs.
Concessional loans are about 98% of external debt in Tonga. The corresponding percentages for
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Samoa, PNG and Fiji are respectively 82%, 77%, 46%, 36% and 16%.
If a large proportion of EDT is on concessional terms, annual total debt-servicing (TDS) costs,
which include interest charges on outstanding debt and installments of principal, would remain
small compared to total debt. Since debt servicing has to be effected in foreign exchange, the
implications in terms of high opportunity costs of transfer of real resources are severe, especially
in those years when foreign exchange earning capacity in terms of exports of goods and services
(XGS) including tourism earnings, is adversely affected by natural disasters or man-made disasters
such as political unrest. The best indicator of repayment capacity of the country is therefore the
debt-servicing ratio (TDS/XGS).
In the case of the selected PICs, we find Samoa’s debt-servicing ratio has been relatively high.
On the other hand, Vanuatu’s has been the least. Although PNG has been transferring sizeable
foreign exchange (US$ 474 million) towards debt servicing, the debt service ratio of PNG has
been smaller than Samoa’s since PNG’s XGS are far more diversified in terms of minerals, oil
and gas.
The annual GDP growth rates of PICs have been modest. While Samoa and Tonga fared
better in the recent five-year period (2000–2004) than in the previous ten years, Fiji, PNG and
Vanuatu did worse, although their growth rates were positive. On the other hand, the average
growth rate of Solomon Islands was negative during 2000–2004. Thus, we have a picture of
low growth rates in the selected PICs along with rise in external debt and budgetary deficits
(Table 3).
3 The terms and conditions of concessional loans from international agencies include low interest rate of 1%, generally
referred to as service charge and long periods of maturity ranging from 30 to 40 years together with a grace period, usually
coinciding with the estimated period of project implementation.
T.K. Jayaraman, E. Lau / Journal of Policy Modeling 31 (2009) 272–288 275
Table 2
Pacific island countries: external debt and debt service 1985–2004
1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Fiji
External debt US$ million 443.7 403.1 246.1 134.2 114.3 140.1 203.1 201.8
EDT (% of GDP) 40.4 31.3 12.8 8.4 7.3 8.1 9.4 8.1
Concessional debt (% of total external
debt)
4.5 7.4 8.5 14 15.2 18.7 16.5 17.9
Total debt service paid (US$ Million) 63.6 105.6 66.3 29.7 22.9 21.7 18.3 14.6
Debt service (TDS)/exports of goods
and services (XGS) (%)
11.7 12 5.8 2.9 2.0 1.6 1.2 0.9
Papua New Guinea
External debt US$ million 2112 2594 2306 2592 2505 2477 2464 2149
EDT (% of GDP) 90.5 83.7 56.5 78.8 89.3 94.6 83.6 61.4
Concessional debt (% of total external
debt)
15.7 21.6 32.1 35.4 32.1 34.9 36.2 41.8
Total debt service paid (US$ million) 340 553 626 306 270 277 294 474
Debt service (TDS)/exports of goods
and services (XGS) (%)
32.5 37.2 20.8 12.9 12.7 15 11.9 17.1
Samoa
External debt US$ million 76.1 92 179.4 197.4 204.3 234.4 365.9 562
EDT (% of GDP) 81.6 56 88 85.5 85.7 90.3 115.1 150
Concessional debt (% of total external
debt)
67.9 90.5 94.6 73.4 69.2 66.1 45.9 31.2
Total debt service paid (US$ million) 7.7 5.5 4.6 8.5 7.4 7.8 13.1 21.1
Debt service (TDS)/exports of goods
and services (XGS) (%)
15.1 5.8 4.3 10.7 9.1 9.3 13.6 19.0
Solomon Islands
External debt US$ million 65.5 120.5 158.7 155.4 163.2 179.8 178 176
EDT (% of GDP) 42.7 58.1 49.5 52 59.5 81.6 79.9 68.8
Concessional debt (% of total external
debt)
61.3 64.1 54.3 74.3 77.1 80.6 81.9 85.1
Total debt service paid (US$ million) 3.8 11.6 8.1 9.1 7.1 5.7 9.4 16.6
Debt service (TDS)/exports of goods
and services (XGS) (%)
4.5 11.8 3.8 7.7 7.2 7.7 9.4 12.0
Tonga
External debt US$ million 24.4 51.9 62.8 60.2 58.2 67.6 79.5 81
EDT (% of GDP) 39 44.5 37.3 39.1 43.6 46.7 47.6 38.2
Concessional debt (% of total external
debt)
88 74.8 84 97.1 97.5 97.5 97.8 97.5
Total debt service paid (US$ million) 0.8 1.9 3 3.8 2.2 2.7 2.6 2.9
Debt service (TDS)/exports of goods
and services (XGS) (%)
1.8 2.8 7.4 12.1 2.6 2.5 5.8 6.8
Vanuatu
External debt US$ million 15.8 38.2 48.9 74.5 71.6 90.5 94.8 118.3
EDT (% of GDP) 12.9 23.5 22.6 32.2 31 39.5 35.8 38.8
Concessional debt (% of total external
debt)
26.6 60.5 86.1 91.4 91.5 78.4 77.4 63.3
Total debt service paid (US$ million) 1.3 2.4 1.6 1.9 1.5 1.9 2.1 3.4
Debt service (TDS)/exports of goods
and services (XGS) (%)
1.5 2.1 1.2 1 0.9 1.5 1.5 1.9
























1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004
Fiji 3.2 3.2 5.1 14.4 11.6 17 2.1 0.2 7 55.2 46.5 42.9 2.9 3 2
PNG 3.7 0.8 1.5 −14.7 −21 −26.5 −3.8 −4.6 −4.3 33.5 33.3 23.9 8.9 2.4 2.1
Samoa 10.5 0.2 1.3 68.3 38.7 41.4 13.2 −5 0.2 40.2 33.3 38.8 −1.5 3.9 4.3
Solomon
Islands
6.1 0.9 5.8 0.9 −2.1 1.1 6.6 −1.1 −1.4 28.3 30 29 4.2 3.3 −2.1
Tonga 0 1.1 1.1 30 −2.1 35.1 −1.5 6.7 2.2 26.2 33.8 43.2 1.8 1.4 3.1
Vanuatu 4.6 3.2 2.7 30.3 20.2 23.8 7.2 8.8 4.6 106.4 108.3 104.2 6.7 1 0.2
Source: ADB (2006); Authors’ calculations.
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3. Modeling debt and growth nexus
3.1. Modeling and data
If the governments find their annual budget deficits could not be financed by domestic bor-
rowing they look to external sources for bridging the gaps. Additional attraction of external
borrowing, which is always in hard currencies, such as the US dollar, the euro or yen, is that
it adds to real resources of the country. Therefore, it becomes imperative that policy makers
ensure prudent utilization of the loan proceeds by investing them in growth-oriented projects
(Daesking & Joshi, 2006; Adams, Sanchez, & Adams, 1983; Kwack, 1983). Further, as growth
enhances the image of the country in the eyes of the creditors in particular, higher growth
would enable the country to borrow on better terms and hence would lead to further rise in debt
level.
Since domestic markets of PICs are small in size, increased production of exportables following
economic growth has to be sold overseas. Thus, growth is also positively associated with rise in
exports of goods and services. A growing export sector as well as a thriving tourism service
sector increases job opportunities and raises incomes, thus paving way for higher growth in GDP.
Since debt servicing has to be effected in foreign exchange, better performance by these two
foreign exchange earning sectors lowers the opportunity costs of transfer of resources involved
in debt servicing (Daesking & Joshi, 2006; Voyvoda & Yedan, 2005; Kwack, 1983). Hence, it
is postulated that higher export earning capability facilitates growth and budget deficits lead to
rise in external borrowing. While domestic borrowing is entirely in domestic currency, external
borrowing being in foreign exchange has an added advantage in terms of addition to real resources
for the economy.
The study uses panel data covering a 17-year period (1988–2004) relating to six PICs for the
empirical analysis. The data are drawn from the Global Development Finance, an annual publi-
cation of World Bank (2006a) and World Development Indicators, also an annual publication of
World Bank (2006b). For our empirical study, we formulate the following functional relationship
for panel data investigation.
RGDP = f (ED, EXP, BD), (1)
where RGDP: real output in index numbers; ED: external debt as percentage of GDP; EXP:
exports of goods and services as percentage of GDP; and BD: budget deficit as percentage of
GDP.
3.2. Panel unit root tests
Recent advances in panel data analysis have focused attention on unit root and cointegration
properties of variables observed over a relatively long span of time across a large number of
cross-section units of countries. In this study, we adopt Maddala and Wu (1999), Hadri (2000),
Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran, and Shin, 2003 panel unit root and stationarity
tests. The null hypothesis of these tests is that the panel series has a unit root (non-stationary)
except for the HADRI test. The HADRI test is similar to the KPSS type unit root test, with a
null hypothesis of stationarity in the panel. For a detailed comparison of the procedures, see
Appendix A.
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3.3. Panel cointegration
We thereafter proceed to examine whether there exists any long run equilibrium relation-
ship between the variables under investigation. Towards this purpose, we resort to Pedroni’s
cointegration tests (1999, 2001, 2004) that allow for heterogeneity in the intercepts and slopes of
the cointegrating equation. Pedroni considers seven different statistics, four of which are based
on pooling the residuals of the regression along the within-dimension (panel test) of panel and
the other three are based on pooling the residuals of the regression along the between-dimension
(group test) of the panel. The within-dimension tests take into account common time factors
and allow for heterogeneity across countries. The between-dimension tests are the group mean
cointegration tests, which allow for heterogeneity of parameters across countries. There are in all
seven-panel cointegration test statistics, which are discussed in Appendix A.
3.4. Panel fully modified OLS (FMOLS) estimates
For obtaining appropriate estimates of the cointegrating relationship, we adopt the panel group
mean Fully Modified OLS following the work by Pedroni (2000). The FMOLS procedure accom-
modates the heterogeneity that is typically present both in the transitional serial correlation
dynamics and in the long run cointegrating relationships. The FMOLS estimator is described
in Appendix A.
3.5. Granger causality tests
The procedures described above are only able to indicate whether or not the variables are
cointegrated and a long run relationship exists between them. To test for panel causality, we
estimate a panel-based vector error correction model (VECM) with a dynamic error correction
term based on Holtz-Eakin, Newey, & Rosen, 1988, 1989. The empirical models are represented














π14ipΔBDit−p + μ1iECTit−1 + ζ1it
(2a)













π24ipΔBDit−p + μ2iECTit−1 + ζ2it
(2b)













π34ipΔBDit−p + μ3iECTit−1 + ζ3it
(2c)
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π44ipΔRGDPit−p + μ4iECTit−1 + ζ4it
(2d)
where Δ is the lag operator, p denotes the lag length. Here all variables are as previously defined.
Using the specification in Equation 2 allows one to test causality direction. For example, in short
run ED does not Granger cause RGDP where, H0 : π12ip = 0 for all i and p while μ1i = 0 in
Equation (2a)4. The rejection implies that ED causes RGDP. Similar analogous restrictions and
testing procedure can be applied in testing the hypothesis that RGDP does not Granger cause
movement in ED where the null hypothesis H0 : π22ip = 0 for all i and p while μ2i = 0 in
Equation (2b).
4. Empirical results
4.1. Panel unit root test results
The results, which are summarized in Table 4, show that the series of the variables, RGDP,
ED, EXP, BD are of an I(1) process, as the pooled data are stationary in their first differences.
4.2. Cointegration test
Having established that all the four variables are integrated of the first order, we proceed to test
whether there is a long run relationship of the system in panel data. From the panel cointegration
results in Table 5, we find strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for
six out of the seven statistics provided by Pedroni (1999). Table 5 reveals rejection of the null of
no cointegration for all cases except the panel PP type ρ-statistic. According to Pedroni (2004),
the panel PP type ρ-test tends to under-reject the null in the case of small sample. Therefore,
we conclude that our variables are in fact cointegrated. Rejection of the null hypothesis of no
cointegration between the I(1) series in the panel implies that the four variables do not drift apart
in the long run steady state relationship. More importantly, the results indicate the benefits of
using pooled panel data from which more variability can be exploited from the cross-sectional
information. Despite the disparities in the individual countries, we found RGDP, ED, EXP and
BD are cointegrated in the multi-country panel setting.
4.3. Fully modified OLS estimates
The long run estimates for each of the six PICs and for the panel of PICs, based on Pedroni’s
group mean FMOLS estimator, are reported in Table 6. The panel results of regression equation
with RGDP as dependent variable show that the coefficients of ED and EXP are positive and
statistically significant and the coefficient of BD is negative and significant. The magnitudes of
4 The F-test or Wald 2 of the explanatory variables (in first differences) indicates the short run causal effects (π12ip =
0for all i and p) while the long run causal (μ1i=0) relationship is implied through the significance of the lagged ECT
which contains the long run information.
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Table 4
Panel unit root tests results
Test statistics
LLC IPS MW (ADF) MW (PP) HADRI Conclusion
A: Level
Model specification: individual effects
RGDP 0.988 (0.838) 1.940 (0.973) 5.006 (0.957) 5.305 (0.947) 3.550 (0.000) –
ED −1.254 (0.105) −1.091 (0.137) 12.988 (0.369) 5.320 (0.946) 3.161 (0.000) –
EXP −0.639 (0.261) −0.180 (0.428) 17.943 (0.117) 17.686 (0.125) 5.058 (0.000) –
BD −0.668 (0.252) −0.342 (0.365) 8.233 (0.766) 16.748 (0.159) 3.447 (0.000) –
Model specification: individual effects and individual linear trends
RGDP −0.344 (0.365) −0.828 (0.203) 11.605 (0.477) 12.692 (0.391) 3.989 (0.000) –
ED −0.492 (0.311) 1.187 (0.882) 5.541 (0.937) 13.963 (0.303) 2.176 (0.014) –
EXP −0.230 (0.408) 0.676 (0.750) 12.527 (0.404) 16.420 (0.172) 5.162 (0.000) –
BD 0.339 (0.632) −0.884 (0.188) 13.140 (0.358) 16.729 (0.160) 3.962 (0.000) –
B: First differences
Model specification: individual effects
RGDP −4.572 (0.000) −3.715 (0.000) 36.559 (0.000) 46.142 (0.000) 0.515 (0.303) I(1)
ED −3.835 (0.000) −2.930 (0.001) 26.358 (0.009) 62.855 (0.000) 0.639 (0.261) I(1)
EXP −4.797 (0.000) −7.206 (0.000) 39.394 (0.000) 70.685 (0.000) −1.416 (0.921) I(1)
BD −5.792 (0.000) −4.601 (0.000) 27.461 (0.006) 71.265 (0.000) −0.817 (0.793) I(1)
Model specification: individual effects and individual linear trends
RGDP −5.178 (0.000)s −3.689 (0.000) 33.405 (0.000) 37.289 (0.000) 0.930 (0.176) I(1)
ED −3.546 (0.000) −2.280 (0.011) 22.172 (0.035) 53.105 (0.000) 1.063 (0.143) I(1)
EXP −3.348 (0.000) −5.129 (0.000) 26.278 (0.009) 60.906 (0.000) 0.005 (0.497) I(1)
BD −6.831 (0.000) −4.433 (0.000) 24.061 (0.020) 52.435 (0.000) 1.032 (0.151) I(1)
Notes: IPS, LLC and HADRI indicated the Im et al. (2003), Levin et al. (2002) and Hadri (2000) panel unit root and
stationary tests. MW (Fisher-ADF) and MW (Fisher-PP) denotes Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP panel
unit root test. The IPS, LLC, MW (Fisher-ADF) and MW (Fisher-PP) examine the null hypothesis of non-stationary while
HADRI tests the stationary null hypothesis. The four variables were grouped into one panel with sample N = 17, T = 6.
The parenthesized values are the probability of rejection. Probabilities for the MW (Fisher-ADF) and MW (Fisher-PP)
tests are computed using an asymptotic χ2 distribution, while the other tests follow the asymptotic normal distribution.
Table 5
Heterogeneous panel cointegration results
Test Statistics
Panel cointegration statistics (within-dimension)
Panel -statistic 3.498 (0.001)
Panel PP type ρ-statistic 1.065 (0.226)
Panel PP type t-statistic −2.358 (0.002)
Panel ADF type t-statistic 3.594 (0.001)
Group mean panel cointegration statistics (between-dimension)
Group PP type ρ -statistic 2.291 (0.002)
Group PP type t -statistic −4.425 (0.000)
Group ADF type t- statistic 3.693 (0.000)
Notes: The number of lag truncations used in the calculation of the seven Pedroni statistics is 3. Probability values are in
parenthesis.
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Table 6
Fully modified OLS estimates
Countries ED EXP BD
Fiji 1.650 (10.640)* 1.460 (2.400)* 0.620 (2.920)*
PNG 0.080 (3.340)* 3.580 (5.180)* −2.870 (−2.980)*
Samoa 0.480 (4.690)* 0.550 (2.900)* −0.910 (−3.840)*
Solomon Islands 0.340 (2.910)* 0.560 (0.710) −1.460 (−2.570)*
Tonga 1.450 (2.480)* 0.570 (2.580)* −1.520 (−7.920)*
Vanuatu 0.810 (2.470)* 1.550 (0.780)* −4.600 (−2.820)*
Panel Group 0.290 (5.910)* 0.830 (2.500)* −1.460 (−4.920)*
Notes: The number of lag truncations used in the calculation of the seven Pedroni statistics is 3. The values in parentheses
are t-statistics. Asterisk (*) shows significance at 5% level.
the estimated coefficients of ED, EXP and BD, whose signs are in accordance with theoretical
expectations, denote the long run elasticities of output with respect to external debt, exports and
budget deficits. One percent rise in external debt stock contributes 0.25% rise in national output.
The elasticity estimate of RGDP with respect to exports is 0.83, indicating 1% increase in exports
leads to 0.83% rise in output. The elasticity estimate of RGDP with respect to budget deficit
is 1.46, indicating 1% rise in budget deficit leads to decline in output by 1.46% confirming the
crowding out effect of budget deficit on private sector.
The signs of the coefficients of ED in all estimated country equations with RGDP as dependent
variable are consistent with a priori expectations and are also statistically significant. An increase
in external debt would trigger correspondingly an upward rise in growth. The elasticity estimates
range from 0.08 (PNG) to 1.65 (Fiji). The results suggest that external debt contributes most to
Fiji’s output, whereas it contributes least to PNG’s output.
The results also indicate a positive and significant relationship between EXP and RGDP for
all the countries except for Solomon Islands. In the case of Solomon Islands, the coefficient of
EXP is not significant, although the sign is positive. The magnitudes of elasticity measures for
RGDP with respect to exports for PNG, Vanuatu and Fiji are more than unity, whereas in the case
of Samoa and Tonga, they are less than one.
As regards the elasticity measures of RGDP with respect to BD, we find that only in the case
of Fiji, budget deficit has positively and significantly contributed to growth. In respect of all other
countries, budget deficit has retarded growth.
4.4. Granger causality results
Given the fact that all the series under investigation are cointegrated, Eq. (2) was estimated
using the panel-based VECM with a dynamic error correction term based on Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1988, 1989). The main interest of the exercise is to establish the causal linkages between external
debt and growth. The empirical results presented in Table 7 are summarized, as follows. In the
long run, we observe there is no Granger causality relationship between RGDP and ED, EXP and
BD, as the coefficient of the error correction term (ECT) in the equation with RGDP as dependent
variable is not statistically significant. In the short run, there is a significant causal relationship
running from ED, EXP and BD to RGDP, based on the Chi-square statistics of the coefficients of
the three variables.
In regard to relationship between ED and the three variables, RGDP, EXP, and BD, we find a
similar absence of long run causality running from the latter three to ED. However, we note in the
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Table 7
Panel granger causality results
Dependent
variables




RGDP – 21.651 (0.000) 11.699 (0.019) 15.340 (0.004) 0.029 0.650
ED 8.170 (0.085) – 6.475 (0.166) 0.682 (0.954) −0.032 −0.423
Notes: Parenthesized values are the probability of rejection of Granger non-causality.  is the first different operator.
Estimations are based on the pooled data for 1988–2004 and 6 Pacific island countries (N = 6, T = 17) with three lags.
short run the causality runs only from RGDP to ED, where there is no such short run causality
linkage running from either EXP or BD, to ED.
5. Summary and policy implications
In recent years, Pacific island countries have been relying more on external borrowing for
financing their development programs and projects in the context of declining annual aid inflows
and rising domestic budget deficits. With the exception of Fiji, the outstanding debt stock of five
PICs is dominated by concessional loans.
The PICs are open economies highly dependent on all imports, ranging from food and fuel
to capital goods and transport machinery. Against the background of limited range of exports of
goods and services, comprising only primary and primary processed products, which include sugar
in Fiji, copra and fish in Solomon Islands and Tonga, and minerals in the case of PNG, besides
tourism, export promotion becomes an important target component of economic growth. Since
external debt-servicing obligations have to be met in foreign exchange, utilization of external
loan proceeds in either foreign exchange earning or import saving projects, becomes critically
important.5
Utilizing a panel data of six selected PICs on output (RGDP), external debt (ED), annual budget
deficits (BD), exports of good and services (EXP), the paper investigated the relationship between
external debt and growth in PICs during the 17-year period (1988–2004). Focusing on relationship
between external debt and growth, the empirical study findings indicate that (i) although there is no
long-term relationship, in the short run there is a causal linkage running from external debt, budget
deficit and exports to output; and (ii) there is a short run bi-directional causal relationship between
economic growth and external debt. The conclusions are: since external borrowing contributes
to growth in PICs in the short run, growth enhances the image of a PIC as an efficient user of
borrowed funds, enabling it to borrow from abroad on better terms; consequently, higher growth
results in further rise in external debt level.
The findings have important policy implications. PICs are benefited by external borrowing in
the short run, which have been dominated by concessional loans from World Bank and Asian
Development Bank. Debt servicing of concessional loans over a long period of 30 years including
5 An IMF study on the debt-to-export dynamics relating in respect of 72 low-income countries has established conditions
for a given debtor country would be more favourable (i) the higher the country’s growth rate of exports relative to the
concessional interest rate, with the effect being magnified when the initial debt ratio is large; (ii) the smaller is its financing
gap; (iii) the higher the concessionality of its debt; and (iv) the more export-oriented it is, that is, the higher its share of
exports in GDP (Daesking & Joshi, 2006).
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grace period of no payment at all does not impose a heavy burden, especially when the country’s
export earning capacity is given a boost by such loans, as the present value of these future transfers
duly discounted would be much smaller than the face value of the debt. As debt servicing involves
a smaller, annual real resource transfer compared to that would have been involved in commercial
loans, PICs are willing to borrow on regular intervals in the short run from the international
agencies. Secondly, since growth in output would improve the credibility of PICs, the international
lending agencies are encouraged to lend frequently and more willingly than before.
The implications of the study findings are of equal interest to developed countries who as
bilateral donors, have been annually assisting PICs with grants since the 1950s. Despite the
steady annual aid inflows, PICs were found to be performing poorly with average annual rate
of growth being less than 2%, in comparison to the similarly placed island nations in the Indian
Ocean, and the Caribbean regions, such as Mauritius (6%) and Barbados (4%). The weak growth
performance of PICs in the midst of plentiful aid was described as Pacific Paradox by a World
Bank study on Pacific islands (1992), which called for new directions in aid strategies, including
donor coordination and aid delivery, including gradual reduction in annual budget support and its
eventual discontinuance, and tying grants to projects and programs.
However, as progress in better aid delivery and management was slow, a study provocatively
titled as Aid has Failed the Pacific? (Hughes, 2003) under the auspices of the Australian think-
tank, the Centre for Independent Studies severely criticized the effectiveness of foreign aid to the
Pacific island countries. Hughes (2003) noted that most of the aid, which totaled US$ 50 billion
during 30 years (1951–2000) was spent on government consumption by elites and bureaucracy,
and often diverted from the intended purposes, as aid was fungible.6 Two empirical studies on
aid effectiveness in PICs (Jayaraman & Choong, 2006; Jayaraman & Ward, 2006) noted that each
year, on an average, about 80% of government budget was spent on house keeping expenditures
dominated by wages and salaries. The findings of these two studies were that aid funds should have
been directed towards outer island development projects, concentrating on physical infrastructure
such as ports and roads connecting farms as well as the hinterland in remote, isolated islands
to market centres and main harbours for speedy movement of surplus agricultural production as
exports, so that rural communities are benefited through rises in their incomes (Jayaraman &
Ward, 2006).
While bilateral donors’ aid moneys were mostly spent on government consumption, loans
from international agencies have always been for specifically earmarked projects and sector or
programs. Any grants given by Asian Development Bank and World Bank, which are regularly
piggy-backed to loans, have been for technical assistance towards training the local staff and
institutional strengthening as well as for project implementation purposes.
Further, the borrowing governments have to commit themselves in terms of budget provisions
in advance for implementation in terms of both local funds and foreign exchange and they have
to submit their claims in the following year to lending agencies for reimbursement of the funds
spent in the preceding year. The fungible nature of funds is thus eliminated to a large extent.
Furthermore, implementation of loan projects and sector/ program loans is not only closely mon-
itored with submission of regular reports but also guided and helped by periodical missions from
6 Most of the bilateral aid programs are for “soft” projects, such as prevention of child abuse, empowerment of women,
AIDS awareness and the like (Hughes, 2003), where seminars and discussions are held with lavish lunches and expensive
cocktail receptions attended by the elites and bureaucracies.
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the headquarters or by offices located in the countries or regions.7 Further, there are always con-
ditionalities, which involve requirements of policy and institutional reforms in steps so that the
release of funds is effected in tranches.
In the case of aid programs by the bilateral governments, conditionalities are singularly absent,
which explains to a great deal why aid often became fungible and how funds earmarked for a given
purpose and mostly upfront, unlike in the case of loans from international financing agencies, got
diverted for other purposes, mostly for consumption by governments. Independent evaluators of
aid effectiveness have in the past recommended that donor countries should channel more of their
aid program funds through international agencies, who could administer them on their behalf
through appropriate mix of loans and grants to developing countries. Although the spirit of such
recommendation was much appreciated by donors, the developed countries, because of their own
independent geo-political interests, appeared to be reluctant to go along with the suggestion.8
It is now increasingly recognized that aside from tourism, PICs have to rely upon exports
of agricultural products and processed agricultural products for their growth, as their domestic
markets are small. The study finding confirms that there is a relationship between growth and
external debt and exports in PICs. Thus, it is clear external borrowing for projects and programs
towards strengthening the export earning capacity is well justified.
Appendix A. Panel estimation: unit root, cointegration and fully modified OLS
A.1. Different procedures for unit root tests
This note is based on surveys, which include Banerjee (1999), Baltagi and Kao (2000),
Breitung and Pesaran (2008, Chap. 9). These tests are also available in the manual of Eviews
(see http://www.eviews.com). Further, Hlouskova and Wagner (2006) also provide a survey on
the performance of the panel unit root and stationarity tests.
Maddala and Wu (1999, MW) developed the test statistics that is based on combining the
p-values of any given test statistic for a unit root in each cross-sectional unit (pi say for the ith
cross-section, i = 1, . . ., N). This is a version of non-parametric test that was based on Fisher





where pi is the p-value of the test statistic for unit i distributed as a χ2 with degree of freedom
twice the number of cross-section units (2N) under null hypothesis. The Fisher test is an exact
and non-parametric test and may be computed for any arbitrary choice of a test for the unit root in
a cross-sectional unit. In this paper, we adopted both the ADF and the Phillips–Perron individual
unit root tests in order to construct the MW test statistic.
7 Recognizing the importance of loan supervision, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank have in recent years
opened more sub regional offices and country offices to supervise loan implementation.
8 The result has been that most of the aid programs funded by donors result in duplication of efforts, leading to
considerable wastage of scarce resources. Further, in the absence of effective coordination amongst aid giving countries,
the recipient countries take advantage of the situation by playing one donor against another.
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In addition, the Levin et al. (2002) test was build upon their earlier paper of Levin and Lin
(1993). This approach is easily describes in the following regression of
xit = γixit−1 + eit for i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T. (A.2)
According to these authors, the panel estimator can be defined as
√



























The Im et al. (2003, IPS) had proposed t-bar statistic that is based on the average of the
individual ADF t-statistics in order to examine the unit root hypothesis for panels. They evaluate
the null hypothesis as H0: βi = 0 for all i, against the alternative that all the series are stationary,
H1: βi < 0 for all i. In short, the test statistics of t-bar are given as
Γt =
√
N{tNT − E(tT |βi = 0)√
Var(tT |βi = 0) ⇒ N(0, 1), where t̄NT = (1/N)
∑N
i=1tiT , (A.5)
such that t̄NT is the average ADF t-statistics for individual countries. The terms E(tT|βi = 0)
and Var(tT|βi = 0) are the finite common mean and variance of the individual ADF statistics tiT,
tabulated in IPS. The test statistics converges to the standard normal distribution as T (time periods
dimension) and N (cross-sectional dimension of the panel) tends to infinity and N/T tends to zero
under the null hypothesis of unit roots, βi = 0, i = 1, 2, . . ., N.
Unlike the other panel unit root test, Hadri (2000) test seeks to test the null hypothesis of
stationarity in the panel. It is based on the residuals from the individual OLS regression of yit on
a constant, or on a constant and trend. We specified the general form specification that includes
both constant and a trend as
yit = αit + βtt + εit, (A.6)
where αit is a random walk: αit = αit−1 + θ·uit where both uit and αit are generated from N(0, 1). The
stationary null hypothesis is expressed as H0 : σ2u = 0. The test statistic for the null hypothesis of






N · T 22 , (A.7)
where Sit =
∑t
j=1εij and 2 is the consistent Newey and West (1987) estimates of the long
run variance of distribution terms εit defined as σ2i = {limT→∞E(S2iT )}/T . To avoid the size
distortions, the truncation lag is set equal to the integer of 4(T/100)1/4 in the Bartlett window.
A.2. Panel cointegration test statistics
There are in all seven-panel cointegration tests. Detailed description of the formulae for the
seven-panel cointegration statistics, are given in Pedroni (1999: 660–661).
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(A) Within-dimension (panel tests):
(a) Panel -statistic,
(b) Panel Phillips–Perron (PP) type ρ-statistics,
(c) Panel Phillips–Perron (PP) t-statistic (non-parametric),
(d) Panel augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) t-statistic (parametric),
(B) Between-dimension (group tests):
(e) Group Phillips–Perron (PP) type ρ-statistics,
(f) Group Phillips–Perron (PP) t-statistic (non-parametric),
(g) Group augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) t-statistic (parametric).
These seven statistics are based on the estimated panel cointegration regression residuals of
the likely cointegrating vector,
RGDPi,t = αi + φit + β1EDi,t + β2EXPi,t + β3BDi,t + εi,t, (A.8)
varying across countries, thus permitting full heterogeneity (βi), fixed effects (αi) and individual
specific deterministic trends (φit) across individual members of the panel.
Pedroni (1999) shows that under appropriate standardization based on the moments of vector
of Brownian motion function, each of these statistics converges weakly to a standard normal
distribution when both the T and N of the panel grow large. The standardized distributions for the





⇒ N(0, 1), (A.9)
where eN,T is the respective panel/group cointegration statistic and μ and ν are the expected
mean and variance of the corresponding statistics. They are computed by Monte Carlo stochastic
simulations and tabulated in Pedroni (1999, Table 2).
A.3. Fully modified OLS estimates
Following Pedroni (2000, 2001), we consider the following cointegrated system for panel data
of
Yit = αi + βiXit + μit, (A.10)
Xit = Xi,t−1 + eit, (A.11)
where i = 1, 2, . . ., N countries over the time period of i = 1, 2, . . ., M. In addition, Zit = (Yit,
Xit)′ ∼ I(1) and ζit = (μit, eit)′ ∼ I(0) with covariance matrix of Ωi = Ω0i + Γi + Γ ′i where Ωi0 is
the contemporaneous covariance, Γ i is the weighted sum of autocovariances while Ωi = LiL′i in
which Li is the lower triangular decomposition of i. For simplicity, we assume that Y = RGDP
while X [ED, EXP, BD] of Eq. (1) and A.8 in this study. The panel FMOLS estimator for coefficient










(Xit − X̄it)Y∗it − T γ̂i
)
, (A.12)
T.K. Jayaraman, E. Lau / Journal of Policy Modeling 31 (2009) 272–288 287
where
Y∗it = (Yit − Ȳ ) −
L̂21i
L̂22i
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